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ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT: AN ANOMALY IN THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The enactment of the English Statute of Frauds' in 1677 has
been attributed to the ineffectual trial procedure of that period.2
Both the practice of awarding new trials and the development of
the rules of evidence were in a formative stage.3 At that time juries
could reject the evidence heard and reach a verdict on their own
privately secured information,4 and the parties to the action, who
were not familiar with the facts, could not testify.5 Fraud and
perjury were to be prevented primarily by removing from juries
any determination of liability in certain cases unless the statutory
formalities were met.6 Furthermore, the turbulent times following
the Civil War, the Commonwealth, and the Restoration probably
encouraged claims without any foundation. 7
The present day statutes of frauds which relate to the sale of
goods are derived from Section seventeen of the English Statute of
Frauds. In England Section seventeen was replaced by Section four
of the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893.8 In the United States
substantially the same language was incorporated in state legisla-
tionO patterned after the Uniform Sales Act.10
SATISFACTION OF THE STATUTE BY ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT
Section four of the Uniform Sales Act provides, among other
things, that an oral "contract to sell or a sale of any goods... shall
not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the
1. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677).
2. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 180
(1898).
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 429-430. But see Rabel, The Statute of Frauds and Comparative
Legal Histor3,, 63 L. Q. Rev. 174 (1947).
5. This disqualification of parties to the action was not removed until
1843. Ireton, Should We Abolish the Statute of Frauds?, 72 U. S. L. Rev. 195,
197 n. 8 (1938).
6. See Thayer, op. cit. supra note 2, at 409-410. The fact that the Statute
was not directed primarily, if at all, at judges, may explain the equitable
doctrine of part performance of contracts pertaining to land. See Costigan,
Has There Been Judicial Legislation in the Interpretation and Application of
the "Upon Consideration of Marriage" and Other Contract Clauses of the
Staute of Frauds?, 14 111. L. Rev. 1, 6-12 (1919).
7. See Wright, Book Review, 55 L. Q. Rev. 189, 204 (1939). But see
Rabel, supra note 4.
8. Ireton, supra note 5.
9. E.g.. Minn. Stat. § 512.04 (1949). The amount fixed for the value of
the goods varies. A contract for the sale of goods of any value is within
the Statute in Florida and Iowa. Fla. Stat. § 725.02 (1951) ; Iowa Code Ann.
§ 554.4 (1950). But only contracts of $2,500 or more are within the Statute
in Ohio. Ohio Code Ann. § 8384 (1948). Minnesota sets the value at $50 or
more. Minn. Stat. § 512.04 (1949).
10. 1 U. L. A. Uniform Sales Act § 4 (1950).
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goods... so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the
same.. .." Acceptance and receipt are separate requirements,"- and
acceptance may precede, accompany, or follow receipt of the goods. 2
Under English law acceptance occurs "when the buyer does any act
in relation to the goods which recognizes a pre-existing contract of
sale."' 3 The Uniform Sales Act provides that acceptance occurs
when the buyer assents to become owner of the goods.' This
difference in definition is especially significant in its application to
cases involving nonconforming goods. A buyer's assertion that the
bulk of the goods does not conform to the sample previously ob-
tained is sufficient acceptance to satisfy the English provision al-
though it may not bind the purchaser to pay for the goods.'3 But
under American law rejection of nonconforming goods is not
sufficient to satisfy the Statute.'6 When the buyer exercises that
degree of control evidenced by a resale, an offer to resell, or a
mortgage of the goods, the conclusion unless otherwise explained is
that he assented to become owner.' 7 An agent may accept for the
buyer,' but supposedly the seller cannot act as the buyer's agent
for this purpose.' 9
Nevertheless, if goods remain in the seller's possession there
may be acceptance and receipt by the buyer if the seller ceases to
hold as owner and agrees to hold as bailee with the buyer's con-
sent.2 0 Conversely, where goods are already in the hands of the
11. See Castle v. Swift & Co., 132 Md. 631, 635, 104 Atl. 187, 189
(1918) ; see 2 Corbin, Contracts § 482 (1950) ; see Willis, The Statute of
Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. L. J. 528 (1928). The presence of
acceptance and receipt is determined independently of when title passes. See
Tonkelson v. Malis, 119 Misc. 717, 720, 197 N. Y. Supp. 309, 312 (Sup. Ct.
1922); Mellen Produce Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 98, 273 N. W. 538, 542(1937).
12. See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 482 (1950).
13. Sale of Goods Act of 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71 § 4(3).
14. 1 U. L. A. Uniform Sales Act § 4(3) (1950).
15. Abbott & Co. v. Wolsey, [1895] 2 Q. B. 97; see Weir, The Sale
of Goods Act-Acceptance, 5 Alberta L. Q. 26 (1942).
16. E.g., Kemensky v. Chapin, 193 Mass. 500, 79 N. E. 781 (1907);
Remick v. Sanford, 120 Mass. 309 (1876) ; Hewett Grain & Provision Co. v.
Spear, 222 Mich. 608, 193 N. W. 291 (1923) ; Taylor v. Mueller, 30 Minn.
343, 15 N. W. 413 (1883) ; Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211 (1872) ; Cleve-
land Worsted Mills Co. v. Brownstone & Co., 190 N. Y. Supp. 601 (Sup. Ct.
1921); Davison Coal Co. v. Empire Brick & Supply Co., 168 N. Y. Supp.
534 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
17. See 1 Williston, Sales § 77 (rev. ed. 1948).
18. See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 485 (1950).
19. Shepherd v. Pressey, 32 N. H. 49 (1855) ; see 2 Corbin, Contracts §
485 (1950); Vold, The Application of the Statute of Frauds Under the
Uniform Sales Act, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 391, 415 (1931).
20. Means v. Williamson, 37 Me. 556 (1854); Bissell v. Balcom, 39
N. Y. 275 (1868) ; Green v. Merriam, 28 Vt. 801 (1856) ; Janvrin v. Max-
well. 23 Wis. 51 (1868). Contra: Easley v. Stewart, 131 Miss. 756, 95 So.
525 (1923).
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buyer as bailee, acceptance and receipt occur when the buyer holds
as owner.2' Some courts require that such changes in relationship
must be proved not by mere words but by some objective act in-
consistent with the previous position.
22
Receipt is the buyer's act of acquiring possession of the goods 23
with the seller's consent.2 Where goods are difficult to move be-
cause of their bulk, receipt may occur by constructive delivery.25
Where goods are in the possession of a third party such a ware-
houseman, the buyer receives the goods when the warehouseman
assents to hold the goods as bailee for the buyer.28 Receipt may
also occur by delivery to a third party transferee designated by the
buyer 2 7 or to an agent of the buyer such as a carrier.28 The exist-
21. Wilson v. Hotchkiss, 171 Cal. 617, 154 Pac. 1 (1915); Harlan v.
Carney, 219 Mich. 539, 189 N. W. 27 (1922) ; Kenesaw Mill & Elevator Co. v.
Aufdenkamp, 106 Neb. 246, 183 N. W. 294 (1921) ; James Mack Co. v. Bear
River Milling Co., 63 Utah 565, 227 Pac. 1033 (1924) ; Snider v. Thrall, 56
Wis. 674, 14 N. W. 814 (1883); Morton v. Kohler & Chase, 70 Cal. App.
458, 233 Pac. 415 (1st Dist. 1925) ; accord, Wilde v. Zimmerman, 46 Wyo. 530,
30 P. 2d 148 (1934) ; see Deitrick v. Sinnott, 189 Iowa 1002, 1004, 179 N. W.
424, 426 (1920).
22. Gardet v. Belknap & White, 1 Cal. 399 (1851) (seller in possession);
Charlotte H. & N. Ry. v. Burwell, 56 Fla. 217, 48 So. 213 (1908) (buyer in
possession) ; Walker & Rogers v. Malsby Co., 134 Ga. 399, 67 S. E. 1039
(1910) (seller in possession) ; Deitrick v. Sinnott, 189 Iowa 1002, 179 N. W.
424 (1920) (buyer's agent in possession); Kirby v. Johnson, 22 Mo. 354
(1856) (seller in possession); Hill v. Dodge, 80 N. H. 381, 117 Atl. 728
(1922) (seller in possession); Maher v. Randolph, 275 N. Y. 80, 9 N. E. 2d
786 (1937) (buyer in possession), 22 Minn. L. Rev. 118; Shindler v. Houston,
1 N. Y. 261 (1848) (seller in possession); see Silkman Lumber Co. v.
Hunholz, 132 Wis. 610, 612-613, 112 N. W. 1081, 1082 (1907). Critics of the
rule argue that when the buyer is already in possession of the goods, mere
words should be enough. Wilson v. Hotchkiss, 171 Cal. 617, 154 Pac. 1 (1915) ;
see 1 Williston, Sales § 87 (rev. ed. 1948). But see 22 Minn. L. Rev. 118
(1937) ; 12 St. John's L. Rev. 347 (1938).
Some courts use the test of whether the seller has surrendered his lien
to ascertain whether receipt has occurred. See Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S.
38 (1888) (alternative holding) ; Northwestern Consol. Milling Co. v. Rosen-
berg, 287 Fed. 785 (3d Cir. 1923) ; Clark & Co. v. Scribner Co., 122 Me. 418,
120 Atl. 609 (1923); Hill v. Dodge, 80 N. H. 381, 117 Atl. 728 (1922)
(alternative holding) ; Green v. Merriam, 28 Vt. 801 (1856) ; Wood, Statute
of Frauds § 335 (1884).
23. Willis, supra note 11, at 529.
24. Young v. Ingalsbe, 208 N. Y. 503, 102 N. E. 590 (1913).
25. E.g., King & Clopton v. Jarman, 35 Ark. 190 (1879) ; Atwell v.
Miller, 6 Md. 10 (1854) ; cf. Boynton v. Veazie, 24 Me. 286 (1844) ; See
Hanson v. Knutson Hardware Co., 182 Wis. 459, 196 N. W. 831 (1924);
1 Williston, Sales § 92 (rev. ed. 1948).
26. E.g., Flanigan v. Waterman, 117 Misc. 617, 191 N. Y. Supp. 646
(Sup. Ct. 1922) ; see Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325, 332 (1875);
see 2 Corbin, Contracts § 491 (1950).
27. See Houghton & Cutton Co. v. Journal Engraving Co., 241 Mass. 541,
135 N. E. 688 (1922) ; Mosher v. Sanford-Evans Co., 68 Mont. 64, 216 Pac.
811 (1923) ; cf. Munroe v. Mundy & Scott, 164 Iowa 707, 146 N. W. 819(1914).
28. Waite v. McKelvy, 71 Minn. 167, 73 N. W. 727 (1898) (by im-
plication); Gaffers-Hinman Coal Co. v. Wessel, 132 Misc. 907, 230 N. Y.
1953] NOTES
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ence of acceptance and receipt is usually a question for the trier
of fact unless the facts are not in dispute.2 9
Part Performance
The effect of acceptance and receipt of part of the goods is to
make the oral contract enforceable as to those undelivered .3 But the
part performance must be pursuant to the alleged transaction.",
Thus, if a sample is part of the bulk of the goods, acceptance and
receipt of the sample validates the entire contract.8 2 But if the
accepted sample is merely a specimen of what is offered for sale
or a device to facilitate sales and thus not pursuant to the transac-
tion, the oral contract is unenforceable as to the undelivered goods.3 3
A similar problem occurs when the claim is made that acceptance
and receipt of part of the goods is only fulfillment of one of several
contracts.3 For example, where there has been acceptance and
receipt of one carload of goods but refusal of a second, if the con-
tract is found to be for two carloads, acceptance and receipt of any
part thereof applies to the entire contract ;35 but if the entire trans-
Supp. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ; see Fontaine v. Bush, 40 Minn. 141, 143, 41 N. W.
465, 466 (1889); Walker Bros. & Co. v. Daggett, 115 Miss. 657, 662, 76
So. 569 (1917) ; see 2 Corbin, Contracts § 490 (1950).
29. See, e.g., Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S. 38, 48 (1887) ; Taylor v.
Mueller, 30 Minn. 343, 348, 15 N. W. 413, 415 (1883).
30. 1 U. L. A. Uniform Sales Act § 4(1) (1950). In some states it is
held, however, that oral contracts not to be performed within a year cannot
be made enforceable by acceptance and receipt of part of the goods. E.g.,
David Taylor Co. v. Fansteel Products Co., 234 App. Div. 548,255 N. Y. Supp.
270 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 261 N. Y. 514, 185 N: E. 718 (1933), 17 Minn.
L. Rev. 107 (1932) ; see Simpson-Fell Oil Co. v. Pierce Petroleum Corp.,
32 F. 2d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1929). Satisfaction of one section of the Statute
might well fulfill the purpose of the Statute and should therefore render the
contract enforceable. See 17 Minn. L. Rev. 107 (1932) ; 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev.
85 (1932).
31. E.g., see Howland v. Iron Fireman Mfg. Co., 188 Ore. 230, 282,
213 P. 2d 177, 199 (1949).
32. Cotton States Hosiery Mills v. Buchwald, 194 N. Y. Supp. 145
(Sup. Ct. 1922) ; Brock v. Knower, 37 Hun 609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885) ; cf.
Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 557 (1877) (acceptance and receipt of copyright
labels validated oral contract to sell liquor) ; see Wood, Statute of Frauds
§ 309 (1884).
33. Richardson v. Smith, 101 Md. 15, 60 Atl. 612 (1905) ; Buchanan v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 130 N. J. L. 10, 30 A. 2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (adver-
tising cut of typewriters not part of goods sold) ; Carter, Macy & Co. v.
Matthews, 220 App. Div. 679, 222 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1st Dep't 1927), aff'd,
247 N. Y. 532, 161 N. E. 171 (1928).
34. This problem arises in determining whether a sale of goods with
an agreement to repurchase is one or two contracts. See, e.g., Gainsburg v.
Bachrack, 241 App. Div. 28, 270 N. Y. Supp. 727 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 266
N. Y. 468, 195 N. E. 158 (1934). Other courts avoid such problems by hold-
ing the oral promise to repurchase to be a contract of indemnity, which is not
within the Statute. E.g., Lingelbach v. Luckenbach, 168 Wis. 481, 170 N. W.
711 (1919).
35. E.g., Hess v. Dicks, 181 Iowa 342, 164 N. W. 639 (1917) ; Farmers
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action is composed of separate contracts, then acceptance and
receipt of any one part will not apply to another.36
If the oral agreement is repudiated, there is disagreement
whether acceptance and receipt of part of the goods are pursuant to
the repudiated oral contract or a new contract. X\hen a seller ex-
pressly repudiates the remainder of a bargain when delivering part
of the goods, it has been held that acceptance and receipt of the
part delivered do not satisfy the Statute as to the repudiated con-
tract.17 But if a buyer accepts and receives part of the goods sub-
sequent to his unequivocal disavowal of the oral agreement, the
contract is still enforceable in its entirety.3
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT
Legal formalities serve two purposes. They evidence the existence
and tenor of a contract in case of controversy and prevent the
making of an inconsiderate contract. 39 The Statute of Frauds was
enacted primarily in furtherance of the first purpose.40 The require-
ment that certain contracts must be in writing to be enforceable
provides an evidentiary safeguard because it provides evidence not
only of the existence but also the terms of a transaction. But accept-
ance and receipt of part or all of the goods merely show the exist-
ence of some transaction4 1 and nay indicate its object and general
Union Co-op. Elevator Federation v. Carter, 152 Neb. 266, 40 N. W. 2d 870(1950) (alternative holding) ; Adams v. King, 68 Okla. 190, 170 Pac. 912, 173
Pac. 206 (1918) (alternative holding) ; Newman v. Multnomah Fuel Co., 93
Ore. 247, 183 Pac. 1 (1919).
36. E.g., M. Samuel & Sons, Inc. v. Cutler, 185 N. Y. Supp. 368 (Sup.
Ct. 1920) ; cf. Scott v. Troop Water Heater Co., 345 Pa. 368, 28 A. 2d 922(1942); see Bundy v. Voelker, 145 Minn. 19, 21, 175 N. W. 1000, 1001
(1920).
37. Zachos v. Kay, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 836 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
38. John Thallon & Co. v. Edsil Trading Corp., 302 N. Y. 390, 98 N. E.
2d 572 (1951), 36 Minn. L. Rev. 293 (1952). But see Adams v. King, 68 Okla.
190, 192, 170 Pac. 912, 914, 173 Pac. 206 (1918) ; Gorden v. Witty, 198 App.
Div. 333, 336, 190 N. Y. Supp. 381, 382 (1st Dep't 1921). Some cases in
which acceptance and receipt of part of the goods have not made the entire
contract enforceable are based on the theory that a new and different con-
tract was made after repudiation. See, e.g., Brister & Koester Lumber Corp.
v. American Lumber Corp., 356 Pa. 33, 50 A. 2d 672 (1947) (seller formally
cancelled parol contract after buyer repudiated) ; Golden Eagle Milling Co. v.
Old Homestead Bakery, 59 Cal. App. 541, 211 Pac. 56 (1st Dist. 1922) (buyer
accepted only after seller made reduction in price) ; cf. Atherton v. Newhall,
123 Mass. 141 (1877) (after acceptance of part, buyer notified seller that he
would be responsible only for part received). Similarly, where the buyer con-
ditionally accepts, there may be a new contract. See Davison Coal Co. v.
Empire Brick & Supply Co., 168 N. Y. Supp. 534, 535 (Sup. Ct. 1918) ; see
2 Corbin, Contracts § 484 (1950).
39. See 2 Austin. Jurisprudence 907 (5th ed. 1911).40. See Fuller, Basic Contract Law 943 (1947).
41. See id. at 957; Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales
917 (1930) ; Vold, supra note 19, at 406. Some authors and courts have made
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nature.4 2 Once the transaction's existence has been so established,
it may be shown by parol evidence that its terms constitute an
otherwise valid contract.43 Thus, acceptance and receipt are not
an effective alternative to a writing.
If the fear of allowing juries to determine liability without a
writing led to the enactment of the Statute, the doctrine of accept-
ance and receipt is an anomaly since the determination of the
occurrence of acceptance or receipt is often a fact question for the
jury.44 On the one hand, the jury is said not to be competent to
handle parol evidence to ascertain the terms of a contract in the
first instance; but on the other hand it is competent to handle similar
evidence to ascertain the occurrence of acceptance and receipt-
which determine existence of an enforceable contract. Furthermore,
when acceptance and receipt are proved, parol evidence may then
establish the terms of the contract 45 and again the jury determines
liability from oral evidence. Some courts have long recognized this
anomaly,46 and as early as 1855 it had been suggested in England
that acceptance and receipt should be abolished as an alternative for
the requirement of a writing because it creates uncertainty and en-
courages perjury in proving the terms of the contract. 7 It has been
said, however, that the Statute of Frauds as a whole is presently
beneficial because it prevents misunderstanding, as well as dis-
honesty, which may arise without a writing.48 Although this con-
tention may have some merit,4 9 it is not really applicable to accept-
ance and receipt because no writing is necessary to show the terms
of a contract if acceptance and receipt can be proved, and in effect
the questionable assumption that acceptance and receipt of part of the goods
ipso facto establish the relationship of vendor and vendee, see, e.g., Hinch-
man v. Lincoln, 124 U. S. 38, 55 (1888); Browne, Statute of Frauds 439
(5th ed. 1895), but they are also consistent with a bailment, consignment for
resale, or gift.
42. Fuller, Basic Contract Law 957 (1947).
43. See Browne, op. cit. supra note 41, at 459.
44. See note 29 supra.
45. See note 43 stpra.
46. See, e.g., Davis v. Moore, 13 Me. 424, 427 (1936) : acceptance and
receipt ". . may leave a purchaser, who buys and receives a single article,
liable to be charged as the purchaser of more, if the vendor can bring perjured
witnesses to say that it was delivered as part of the greater number pur-
chased."
47. Second Report to Parl. of Commissioners on Mercantile Laws 120
(1855).
48. See, e.g., Hill v. Dodge, 80 N. H. 381, 117 Atl. 728 (1922). The
court also stated that to hold that the Statute is avoided by a verbal waiver
of acceptance and receipt of part of the goods would be to circumvent its
purpose. Id. at 383, 117 AtI. at 729. It is questionable whether there is any
more danger admitting parol evidence as to waiver than there is in admitting
parol evidence to prove acceptance and receipt or the terms of the transaction.
49. See Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 41, at 916.
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this argument attacks the validity of this exception to the Statute.
The validity of the acceptance and receipt doctrine is certainly
not strengthed by the American rule regarding rejection of non-
conforming goods.50 Cases have arisen in which the defendant has
resisted a contract suit by pleading defective goods and the
Statute of Frauds." Even though proof of the soundness of the
goods is established, defendant may escape liability on the ground
that there was no acceptance and receipt to satisfy the Statute, since
when he rejected the goods-by a mere oral assertion-he thought
they were defective.5 2 It is not surprising that the Statute has been
condemned as an aid to dishonesty,53 for it would be no great hard-
ship or injustice for the buyer to defend on the merits when a
seller tenders nonconforming goods.
Nor is that the sole situation where recourse to the Statute
is mainly to avoid the substantive controversy rather than prevent
fraud or perjury. When there has been partial performance and
the issue is risk of loss as to the amount undelivered, 54 or when
acceptance has been induced by mistake as to some material fact 55
or by false representations, 6 the buyer should be required to defend
on the merits, not the Statute, for any acceptance of goods under
these circumstances should sufficiently protect him from being held
to a fictitious transaction.57 For the same reason, in cases involving
samples,58 where the real issue is whether the transaction as to
the remainder of the goods has advanced beyond the stage of pre-
liminary negotiations, 9 there is no merit in disguising it with
terminology of acceptance and receipt.60 The fallibility of the court
50. See note 16 supra and text thereto.
51. See, e.g., Cleveland Worsted Mills Co. v. Brownstone & Co., 190
N. Y. Supp. 601 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
52. Ibid; see Kemensky v. Chapin, 193 Mass. 500, 506, 79 N. E. 781, 783(1907) (buyer's rejection may be arbitrary). For a more desirable solution
under English law, see note 15 supra.
53. See note 69 infra.
54. See Atherton v. Newhall, 123 Mass. 141 (1877); Townsend v.
Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325 (1875) ; cf. Dean v. Given Co., 123 Me. 90, 121 Atl.
644 (1923).
55. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519 (1869) (bill of lading
accepted after barge containing goods had sunk).
56. See, e.g., Barrett Mfg. Co. v. D'Ambrosio, 90 Conn. 192, 96 At. 930
(1916).
57. See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 484 (1950) ; 1 Williston, Sales § 83 (rev.
ed. 1948).
58. See notes 32 and 33 supra and text thereto.
59. See, e.g., Scott v. Troop Water Heater Co., 345 Pa. 368, 28 A. 2d
922 (1942).
60. The court's concern in the Scott case, supra note 59, is more in accord
with the second purpose for legal formalities-preventing inconsiderate con-
tracts. For a discussion of the prophylactic regulation of contracts see
Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An. Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L. J.
704, 746-748 (1931).
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or jury in reaching the correct result from the same parol evidence
is not dependent on the terminology used to define the issue. But
the proof introduced at the trial is more likely to lead to a just
decision if the real issue is litigated rather than the technical
formalities.
In those cases involving the question of whether there are one
or two contracts, a buyer can escape liability with impunity even
though he admits the oral contract. The primary purpose of the
Statute-to protect parties from being held to contracts not actually
made-is thereby perverted. For example, in Bundy v. Voelker,61
although the existence of an oral agreement as to a third carload was
recognized in the order for a new trial,12 admitted by defendant's
answer in the second trial, 3 and there assumed in the court's charge
to the jury, 4 the case was litigated on the issue of enforceability by
acceptance and receipt of part of the goods.
THE MODERN ROLE OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The motives for originally enacting the Statute no longer exist. 5
In reaching their verdicts, juries are limited to the evidence sub-
mitted in court, parties to the action may testify, the new trial
has become available, and the rules of evidence have been developed
to protect the parties to the suit; and one critic of the Statute has
found little evidence of perjury being a widespread practice. 6
It must be conceded, however, that the Statute has thwarted
61. 145 Minn. 19, 175 N. W. 1000 (1920).
62. Ibid.
63. Transcript of Record, p. 6, Bundy v. Meyer, 148 Minn. 252, 181
N. W. 345 (1921) : ". . . said co-partners informed plaintiff that they would
take and receive more cabbages from him upon the same terms and condi-
tions as they had purchased said two carloads of cabbages. That at the time
said co-partners paid plaintiff for said two carloads of cabbages and at the
time they informed him that they would receive more cabbages from him, they
had no knowledge or information of the fact that plaintiff had placed and con-
cealed therein immature, small, leafy and unmarketable cabbages and would
not have accepted the same or paid therefor had they had knowledge thereof."
64. Transcript of Record, pp. 200, 201, Bundy v. Meyer, 148 Minn.
252, 181 N. W. 345 (1921). The jury was charged that if they found that
the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was for three carloads and
pursuant to that contract the defendant accepted two carloads of cabbages,
then he would be bound to receive and pay for the third car received. But if he
purchased only two carloads and that agreement had been completed in full,
and if he then entered into another contract for a third car which he refused
to accept, he would not be liable because it was within the Statute of Frauds.
65. See Ireton, supra note 5, at 196-197, Willis, stepra note 11, at 431 ;
Rep. English Law Revision Committee, The Statute of Frauds and the
Doctrine of Consideration, 15 Can. B. Rev. 585, 589 (1937).
66. See Willis, supra note 11, at 539. Although his observation may be
disputed, the concern today is not in being able to detect the perjurer but
whether there are any effective sanctions for perjury. See McClintock,
What Happens to Perjurers, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 727 (1940).
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the assertion of purely fictitious transactions. 67 This salutary effect
as to actual cases of fraud has been gained at the expense of pro-
viding a technicality to avoid honest transactions. 68 Thus, the
Statute has often been attacked as an aid to the unscrupulous. 9 The
English Commissioners on Mercantile Laws of 185570 and the
English Law Revision Committee of 193771 recommended the re-
peal of the Section pertaining to the sale of goods because they felt
that the Statute promoted, rather than restrained, dishonesty. Nor
have the civil law countries felt the need for the statute of frauds.7 2
The assumption that the Statute has increased the use of writ-
ings in the sales of goods has been questioned on the premise that
the law has little power to control conduct in this area. 73 Common
sense or custom regulates the mass of human transactions, 74 and
though it would be nice in theory to reduce every contract to writing,
a large amount of business is nevertheless carried on orally.7 5 Al-
though there has been an increase in the use of written records, 7 6 it
may be attributed in part to the growing size of business and the
67. See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 275 at 13 (1950).
68. Ibid. Of course, social and business pressures will always deter
somewhat the avoidance of honest transactions.
69. See, e.g., Burdick, A Statute Promoting Fraud, 16 Col. L. Rev.
273 (1916) ; Stephen and Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds,
1 L. Q. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1885) ; Willis, supra note 11, at 432. But see Llewellyn,
op. cit. supra note 41, at 916-918; Lilienthal, Judicial Repeal of the Statute
of Frauds, 9 Harv. L. Rev. 455 (1896).
70. Second Report to Parl. of Commissioners on Mercantile Laws(1855).
71. Their sixth interim report is reprinted as, The Statute of Frauds
and the Doctrine of Consideration, 15 Can. B. Rev. 585 (1937).
72. See Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 427, 433 (1950). The draft of an International Sales Act
had no provisions comparable to the Statute of Frauds. See Rabel, A Draft of
An International Law of Sales, 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 543, 558-559 (1938).
Neither do Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
and West Virginia have any corresponding statutory provision. 1 Williston,
Sales § 51 (rev. ed. 1948).
73. See Stephen and Pollock, supra note 69, at 6.
74. See Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be
Enacted?, 59 Yale L. J. 821, 829 (1950) ; Stephen and Pollock, supra note
69, at 6.
75. See Corbin, supra note 74, at 829; Rabel, The Statute of Frauds
and Comparative Legal History, 63 L. Q. Rev. 174, 187 (1947) ; Wright,
Book Review, 55 L. Q. Rev. 189, 204 (1939); Comment, 13 Cornell L. Q.
303, 306 (1928) ; 61 Yale L. J. 585 n. 2 (1952). In 1855, the Manchester and
Dublin Chambers of Commerce reported that the great majority of mercantile
contracts were oral. See Second Report to Parl. of Commissioners on Mer-
cantile Laws 6 (1855).
Professor Llewellyn recognizes that much business will always be done
orally but supports the Statute because it encourages written contracts-and
writings are subject to less misunderstanding. Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note
41, at 916-917.
76. Thus, it is argued that the Statute should be retained since it is
in accord with commercial practice apart from the Statute. See Llewellyn,
supra note 60, at 747.
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consequent need for office memoranda; and standardized forms have
been adopted by industries chiefly to expedite negotiations.77 But
acceptance and receipt as an alternative to a writing have very
little to do with regulating transactions in advance of litigation."8
As has been discussed, acceptance and receipt can provide little
protection against fraud and perjury because parol evidence is
admissible to prove the terms of the contract and to prove accept-
ance and receipt in the first instance. The dissatisfaction con-
cerning the present law of acceptance and receipt is illustrated by
the solution proposed in the Uniform Commercial Code, which
would limit rather than enlarge the effect of acceptance and receipt
under the present legislation. An oral contract for the sale of goods
would be enforceable only to the extent of the goods already
accepted and received, and the price would be apportioned to such
goods.79 If there could be no fair apportionment, the remedy would
apparently be quasi contractual.8 But in those cases involving de-
fective goods, mistake, or misrepresentation, the defendant would
no longer be able to avoid liability as to the goods delivered by
asserting the Statute as a defense.
This proposed Code would also provide that a contract otherwise
valid but within the Staute is enforceable "if the party against whom
enforcement is sought admits in his pleading or otherwise in court
that a contract for sale was made." 81 Thus, one could no longer
escape liability by asserting that the oral agreement was a separate
transaction from the one under which part of the goods were
accepted and received.
This Code substantially adopts the provisions of the Statute
of Frauds by requiring some writing to validate a contract of sale. 2
But the Code's requirement of a writing would be more uncom-
promising, in some respects, than that of the present Statute be-
cause the effect of the exception-acceptance and receipt-would be
to make the contract enforceable only as to the goods actually de-
77. See 3 Corbin, Contracts § 548 (1950). The adoption of standard
forms arose because the seller and the buyer sent out conflicting sales and
purchase forms; and the transactions, although in writing, were a source
of much litigation. See Fuller, Basic Contract Law 178-180 (1947).
78. See Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 41, at 917. Corbin argues that
such an easy method of satisfying the Statute strongly suggests that the
Statute is not needed. See Corbin, supra note 74, at 831 n. 7.
79. UCC § 2-201(3) (c) and comment 2 (Official Draft 1952) ; see 2
Corbin, Contracts § 482 (1950) ; Williston, The Law of Sales in the Pro-
posed Uniform Conmercial Code, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 575 (1950).
80. See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 482 (1950) ; Williston, mpra note 79, at
575-576.
81. UCC § 2-201 (3) (b) and comment 7 (Official Draft 1952).
82. UCC § 2-201 (1) (Official Draft 1952).
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livered.83 A seller would have no opportunity to enforce an oral
contract as to the undelivered goods unless the buyer admitted in
court or in his pleading that a contract had been made.84 The buyer
would probably not make this mistake since the Code immunizes
him from liability for goods undelivered, without proving that the
goods already delivered were not part of the bulk or were pursuant
to a separate contract or one replacing the repudiated oral agree-
ment. In abrogating the present effect of acceptance and receipt,
the Code would make the Statute, on its face, more consistent in-
ternally. But Corbin attacks the solution by pointing out that
the terms of the oral contract will nevertheless have to be proved
in order to justly apportion the price of the goods accepted and
received ;' and if the terms of the contract are proved to justly
apportion the price, there is little reason for not enforcing the entire
contract.8
Thus, it is evident that the Code has retreated to a position of
defending an obsolescent formalism which represents the times in
which trial procedure was in its infancy, condons breach of honest
contract, and is disregarded commercially unless in accord with
common sense reasons for having a writing. If the Code is adopted,
as is presently sought,8 7 this statutory provision requiring a writing
should be deleted in favor of a practice of determining liability in a
sales transaction by testing the quality of the evidence whatever
form it takes.
83. See note 79 supra.
84. See note 81 supra.
85. See note 79 supra.
86. See Corbin, supra note 74, at 831 n. 7.
87. Pennsylvania has already enacted the Code into law. 21 U. S. L.
Week 2500 (April 14, 1953).
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